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ABSTRACT
For intellectual property law and policy, the impact that patent rights may
have on the ability of small companies to compete in the smartphone market is a
critically important issue for continued robust innovation. Open and competitive
markets provide vitality for the development of smartphone technologies.
Nevertheless, the impact of patent rights on the smartphone industry is an
unexplored area of empirical research. Thus, this Article seeks to show how
patent rights affect the ability of small participants to enter, compete, and exit
smartphone markets. The study collected and used comprehensive empirical data
on patent grants, venture funding, mergers and acquisitions, initial public
offerings, patent litigation, and marketing research data. This Article shows
empirically that small participants succeed in the market when they have a low
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and specific critical mass of patents and that this success exceeds the general
norms in the startup world. Surprisingly, the analysis demonstrates that the level
of financing and market success do not increase with larger patent portfolios.
Lastly, despite the controversies over patent trolls, this Article demonstrates that
patent litigation, whether from operating companies or NPEs, does not appear to
be a significant concern for small players and does not appear to pose barriers to
entry. The Article concludes by arguing that patent rights are providing
incentives for innovation among small industry players and that contrary to some
expectations, patent rights support competitiveness in the smartphone industry
for small market players.
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INTRODUCTION
The relationship of patent rights to the competitiveness of companies in the
smartphone industry is critical to understanding the dynamics of the
smartphone market. This market is growing rapidly worldwide at staggering
rates. Just in the third quarter of 2014, vendors sold over 325 million
smartphones 1 Meanwhile, “patent grants and patent lawsuits are rising
dramatically.” 2 Whether or to what extent patents support competitiveness or
present barriers to entry is thus a key policy question for intellectual property
and the development of future innovations in the smartphone field.
Prior work shows that very little empirical analysis focuses on the specific
role that patents play in the competitiveness of participants in information
technology based markets. 3 To begin to fill this gap, the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) commissioned a study that examined the role of
patents with respect to large market participants in the smartphone industry (the
“2012 Smartphone Patent Study”). 4 The 2012 Smartphone Patent Study found
that there was significant fluidity in market entry and exit among the large
companies during a period of dramatic growth and concentration of patent
portfolios. 5 The study also showed that patent litigation reflected a trend for
large companies to use patents as a defensive business strategy. 6
Since the 2012 Smartphone Patent Study only examined large participants
in the market, there remains a need to understand the impact on small
participants such as small businesses, individual inventors, or organizations
with relatively limited involvement in the smartphone field. The goal of this
study is thus to analyze comparable empirical data about small market
participants with patents and individual inventors in order to ascertain how
patents impact their ability to compete in the marketplace.

1. See Press Release: Worldwide Smartphone Shipments Increase 25.2% in the Third
Quarter with Heightened Competition and Growth Beyond Samsung and Apple, Says IDC
(Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS25224914.
2. 2014 Patent Litigation Study, PWC at 5-6 (Jul. 2014) [hereinafter 2014 PWC
study],
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2014-patentlitigation-study.pdf.
3. See Committee on Development and Intellectual Property (CDIP), Report on an
Analysis of the Economic/Legal Literature on Intellectual Property (IP) Rights: a Barrier to
Entry? WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (Jan. 16, 2012),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_8/cdip_8_inf_6_corr.pdf.
4. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Jamela Debelak, Daniel Gross & Elaine Mindrup, The
Impact of the Acquisition and Use of Patents on the Smartphone Industry (WIPO: 2013),
FORDHAM CENTER ON LAW AND INFORMATION POLICY (Dec. 13, 2012) [hereinafter 2012
Smartphone Patent Study], http://www.wipo.int/ip-competition/en/studies/clip_study.pdf.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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In Part II of this study, we summarize the definitions for the smartphone
market that will be used by our analysis and describe the database of
smartphone patents used for this study. To provide comparability, these
definitions and the database were the same as those used and elaborated in the
2012 Smartphone Patent Study. 7 In Part III, we develop a methodology to
identify small participants in the market and to collect data for these
participants. Because comprehensive and reliable data on all small market
participants is not readily available, the study analyzed empirical data for
market participants holding at least one patent, as this group of market
participants can be identified comprehensively. However, this selection
necessarily limits the results and statistical analysis to those entities that have
opted into the patent system and omits small entities that have not sought patent
protections for their innovations. 8 In Part IV, we present the findings from the
empirical data in terms of the impact of patents on the small participants. Part
V then addresses the impact of patent rights on the openness of the smartphone
market with respect to small participants.
I.

DEFINING THE MARKET AND PATENT DATABASE

The 2012 Smartphone Patent Study defined smartphones as “hand-held
computing devices that (a) have the ability to make phone calls over cellular
networks and (b) can transfer data and run applications over mobile computing
networks.” 9 That study further defined the smartphone market as comprised of
four segments:
1. Handset providers: Companies that provide smartphone devices to
consumers.
2. Software developers: Companies that develop operating systems,
communication protocols, and other applications governing the
behaviors of smartphones. Software developers provide software
packages to handset providers in the form of operating systems
and applications as well as to consumers in the form of
applications. Operating system vendors represent a subset of the
software developer market segment.
3. Hardware suppliers: Companies that provide hardware integrated
into the handsets, including computer chips, batteries, antennas,
7. Id. at 2-6.
8. This is an unavoidable selection bias. In the context of software, one study argues

that startups in the software field may be reluctant to seek patents because of cost and a
belief that patent rights will not be sufficiently useful to protect their inventions. See Stuart
J.H. Graham, Robert P. Merges, Pam Samuelson & Ted Sichelman, High Technology
Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Study, 24
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1255, 1309 (2009). If this is correct more specifically for the smartphone
field, then our study findings will not address those innovators.
9. 2012 Smartphone Patent Study, supra note 3, at 2.
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and many other significant components. Hardware suppliers
primarily sell integrated hardware, such as chipsets, to handset
providers, but also provide parts and accessories, such as extended
life batteries and cases, directly to consumers.
4. Designers: Companies that focus on aesthetic design as a selling
point for their products. Designers represent a subset of the
handset providers and software developers, and generate hardware
designs and designs for visual displays for smartphone handsets. 10
We use the same definition and market segments for this study.
Similarly, the 2012 Smartphone Patent Study identified the most relevant
patent classifications for smartphone technologies. The research showed that
class 455 in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
classification was the most relevant, and that a total of 14 classifications related
most closely to smartphones:
Table 1 – Relevant Patent Classes 11
Class
320
341
349
361
370
375
379
398
455
704
706
707
715
719

Description
Electricity: Battery or Capacitor Charging or Discharging
Coded Data Generation or Conversion
Liquid Crystal Cells, Elements and Systems
Electricity: Electrical Systems and Devices
Multiplex Communications
Pulse or Digital Communications
Telephonic Communications
Optical Communications
Telecommunications
Data Processing: Speech Signal Processing, Linguistics, Language
Translation, and Audio Compression/Decompression
Data Processing: Artificial Intelligence
Data Processing: Database and File Management or Data Structures
Data Processing: Presentation Processing of Document, Operator
Interface Processing, and Screen Saver Display Processing
Interprogram Communication or Interprocess Communication (IPC)
(Electrical Computers and Digital Processing Systems)

From these classes, the 2012 Smartphone Patent Study assembled a patent
bibliographic database for the utility patents and a separate database for the
design patents, each consisting of the following information for all patents
granted between 2006 and 2012:
• Abstract – summarizing the contents of the patent.

10. Id. at 3.
11. Id. at 8.
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•

Patent Type – determining whether the patent is a utility or design
patent.
• Patent Number – identifying the relevant patent.
• U.S. Classification – identifying the primary classification used
for the relevant patent.
• Title – identifying the contents of the patent.
• Number of Claims – identifying how many claims were included
in the issued patent.
• Assignee – identifying the current patent holder for the issued
patent. 12
This study takes the 2012 smartphone patent bibliographic databases as the
starting point. The data set reflects both the rapid growth and the importance of
smartphone innovation over the last ten years. In 2012, 20% of the patents
granted were related to mobile phones. 13 Less than a decade ago, this number
was lower than 10%. 14 Overall, smartphone patents account for just over 16%
of all active patents. 15 In comparison, the pharmaceutical industry has
accounted for a little over 6% of U.S. patents over the past 15 years, and the
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) sector accounts for 40%
of U.S. patents. 16
II.

SMALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE SMARTPHONE MARKET AND DATA
COLLECTION

To focus on small smartphone market participants, this study used several
metrics to select a random sample of appropriately sized entities and individual
inventors. The study looks only at entities and inventors that have already
sought patents because comprehensive, meaningful public data is available for
these market participants unlike other small private businesses. As a result, the
study does not consider entities that have no patents such as those organizations
that license technologies rather than innovate, or those organizations that
choose not to seek patents for their innovations. 17 We first identified small

12. Id. at 11.
13. CHETAN SHARMA, MOBILE PATENTS LANDSCAPE: AN IN-DEPTH QUANTITATIVE

ANALYSIS 7-8 (2d ed. 2009).
14. Id.
15. Daniel O’Connor, One In Six Active U.S. Patents Pertain To The Smartphone,
PROJECT DISCO (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.project-disco.org/intellectual-property/one-insix-active-u-s-patents-pertain-to-the-smartphone/.
16. Id.
17. Relevant data for non-patent-holding individuals and organizations in the
smartphone field is not publicly available. Some studies, though, argue that innovators in
certain industries including software choose to use strategies other than intellectual property
rights to commercialize their discoveries. See Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information
without Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2012).
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participants based on the size they claimed in filings with the USPTO. We then
narrowed the selection based on the number of patents they had in the field and
the number of patents they had in a particular subfield. From those entities and
inventors, we chose a random sample and conducted a final manual filter to
assure that the patent holders were small participants in the smartphone market.
To collect further data for analysis, we researched publicly available
information about each patent holder and prepared a survey to elicit
information about the importance of their patents.
A. Identification of the Entity Size Disclosed to the USPTO
Because the U.S. patent statute provides for reduced filing fees and
maintenance fees for small companies and individual inventors, the USPTO has
records on the size of patent applicants and holders. Companies and individual
inventors qualify for the reduced fees if they meet the following criteria:
Small Business Entity:
1. Applicant has fewer than 500 employees; and
2. No rights in the application are promised or licensed to an entity
that does not qualify. 18
Micro Entity:
1. Must qualify as a Small Business Entity (per the above);
2. Applicant or any joint inventor has filed fewer than four U.S. nonprovisional patent applications (not assigned to a prior employer);
3. Applicant and listed inventor have income for the past year less
than $150,000 19; and
4. No rights in the application have been promised or licensed to a
non-micro-entity. 20
Fordham CLIP obtained the entity size based on these fee categories for all
entries in the smartphone patent bibliographic database where an assignee was
identified. For utility patents, Fordham Center on Law and Information Policy
(CLIP) also extracted size information from the USPTO database of
maintenance events. 21 For design patents, size data is only available for
applications because design patents are not subject to the payment of
maintenance fees. 22 In both the design and utility databases, entity size was
18. 13 C.F.R. § 121.802(a) (2013).
19. This number will change annually based upon census median U.S. household

income (3X median income).
20. 35 U.S.C. § 123 (2013).
21. Every time a payment was made on a utility patent, the entity size of the payor at
the time of payment was recorded by the USPTO.
22. Fordham CLIP thus captured entity size as of the time the application was filed.
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often not available for patents where no assignee was named (these patents
were likely to be held by individual inventors or scholars). Fordham CLIP
added all entity size data to the smartphone patent bibliographic database for
analysis.
Table 2 below shows the breakdown by entity size for both the utility and
design smartphone patent bibliographic databases. 23
Table 2 – Number of Entities by Entity Size

Entity Size

Number of Entities

Large
Small
Micro
Unavailable
Total

223,252
48,945
89
42,204
314,490

B. Selecting Small Participants and Generating a Random Sample
From the large number of potential market participants, relevant small
participants had to be selected and a random sample drawn for analysis. In
selecting the population to analyze, we sought a diverse group of small
businesses and startups. First, the utility patent database was divided by
classification into three groups—communications, hardware, and software—
using the classifications shown in Tables 3, 4, and 5 and drawn from the 2012
Smartphone Patent Study 24:

23. Another study estimated that approximately 250,000 patents were relevant to
modern smartphones in 2011. RPX Corp., Amendment No. 3 to Form S-1, 59 (Apr. 11,
2011),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1509432/000119312511240287/ds1.htm
(last visited Nov. 20, 2014).
24. 2012 Smartphone Patent Study, supra note 3, at 12-13.
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Table 3 – Hardware Classification Numbers

Class
349
361
320

Description
Liquid Crystal Cells, Elements and Systems
Electricity: Electrical Systems and Devices
Electricity: Battery or Capacitor Charging or Discharging
Table 4 – Software Classification Numbers

Class
341
704

706
707
715

Description
Coded Data Generation or Conversion
Data Processing: Speech Signal Processing,
Linguistics, Language Translation, and Audio
Compression/Decompression
Data Processing: Artificial Intelligence
Data Processing: Database and File Management or Data
Structures
Data Processing: Presentation Processing of
Document, Operator Interface Processing, and Screen
Saver Display Processing
Table 5 – Communications Classification Numbers

Class
370
375
379
398
455
719

Description
Multiplex Communications
Pulse or Digital Communications
Telephonic Communications
Optical Communications
Telecommunications
Interprogram
Communication
or
Interprocess
Communication (IPC) (Electrical Computers and Digital
Processing Systems)

Design patents were placed into their own category.
Table 6 below shows the breakdown by entity size and smartphone-related
category of the entire smartphone bibliographic patent database.
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Table 6 – Smartphone Patent Bibliographic Database
Category Entity Size

Category/Size

Number of
Entities

Communications
Large
Small
Micro
Unavailable
Hardware
Large
Small
Micro
Unavailable
Software
Large
Small
Micro
Unavailable
Design
Large
Small
Unknown
Grand Total

95,057
86,835
7,301
30
891
25,727
23,225
2,203
13
286
43,186
38,177
4,373
46
590
150,520
35,068
75,015
40,437
314,490

Because the number of qualifying entities in the database was so large, a
random sample was necessary. However, the generation of a random sample
from the database at large (or “direct element sampling”) would have yielded
unpredictable results and would not necessarily provide a clear picture of the
various kinds of small players in the data set. For instance, a random sample
may have been skewed toward one category of patents such as design or
communications, which make up larger relative proportions of the database.
Similarly micro entities made up less than 1% of the database entries because
the designation is new and might have been missed altogether. To avoid these
potential biases, we adopted the “population framing” method for the
generation of the random sample. 25
25. In statistics, “population framing” allows the survey planner to organize a data set
to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the random sample and to ensure that the
various groups of interest are represented in the random sample. See RAYMOND JAMES
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For population framing, the patent database was further subdivided as
shown below in Table 7. From each of the patent classification groupings,
companies with three to five patents were extracted. This ensured that niche
players in each category would be analyzed. We did not limit these patentholders by entity size in order to capture startups and small companies that
were purchased by larger entities before making their first maintenance
payment. Similarly, we extracted as a sample frame for each of the patent
classification groupings, companies that reported a small or micro entity size,
regardless of the number of patents they held. This was to ensure there was no
bias in the sampling based on the number of patents. To obtain companies that
were not limited to niche products or services, we also extracted all entities
with one or two patents regardless of reported size as a population frame and all
companies that reported small or micro status with ten or more patents. To
capture individual inventors or unincorporated entrepreneurs, we also framed
all filings for which entity status was not available and that had no assignee
name.
Table 7 – Population Sample Frames

Category

Entity Size

Number of Patents

DB Hits

Communications
Communications
Hardware
Hardware
Software
Software
Design
Design
Any
Any
Any

Any
Small or Micro
Any
Small or Micro
Any
Small or Micro
Any
Small or Micro
Small or Micro
Any
Small, Micro,
or N/A

Between 3 and 5, inclusive
Any
Between 3 and 5, inclusive
Any
Between 3 and 5, inclusive
Any
Between 3 and 5, inclusive
Any
10 or more
1 or 2
N/A – (No Assignee Name)

3,692
7,331
1,283
2,216
2,128
4,419
12,067
35,069
14,713
34,492
2,250

Grand Total

119,660

Because the frame selection resulted in more companies than could
reasonably be studied, a random sample was chosen. Each entry was assigned a
random number within each population frame and the groups were shuffled by
sorting on the random number. We chose an initial random sample of 400
companies by extracting the patent entries from the categories shown in Table
7. This large initial sample was chosen to account for duplication and so that
sampling errors could be corrected through manual filtering, as discussed
below.
JESSEN, STATISTICAL SURVEY TECHNIQUES 160-62 (1978).
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Finally, to be sure that we did not omit any important players with patented
technologies in the relevant field, we applied key word searches to the full
smartphone patent bibliographic database for a manual review. The key word
search was conducted on the abstract and title of every patent in the database
for the following terms: “smartphone,” “smart phone,” “handset,” “mobile
phone,” “cellular phone,” “touchscreen,” “3G,” and “4G.” Small or micro
entities that hit on the keywords were added to the random sample for filtering.
Most results yielded large companies such as Samsung and High Tech
Computer Corp. Only nineteen potentially small companies were identified
using this method and were included in the initial frame.
C. Manual Filtering
Manual filtering entailed a review of the patent or patents for each of the
randomly selected entities and an initial review of the publicly available data
for each company or inventor to confirm the entity size as a small company and
whether the business was relevant to the smartphone industry. 26 Some very
large organizations with few patents in the relevant field were removed by this
filtering. 27 Similarly, a manual review and filter of the nineteen potentially
small companies identified by key word searches was also conducted. This
review sought to confirm the claimed entity size, the relevance of the patents to
smartphones, and the actual involvement of the business in the smartphone
market.
Also, some patents were assigned to multiple large entities at the same
time. These were either charitable conglomerates or telecommunications
standards co-invented in the context of a standards setting organization. 28
Though these entities were small patent holders and novel, we did not consider
them to be small players. Therefore, they were not included in the final sample.
In addition, several very large entities, captured in the random sample as
patent holders, had small entity status due to their non-profit structure. This
included government-sponsored research institutes, institutions of higher
education, and standards setting organizations listed as patent owners. These
26. The main sources used (where available) for this preliminary review were the
entities’ own websites, LinkedIn and similar marketing materials, Business Week entries,
other patents assigned to the entity or inventor, and news articles.
27. This included companies like Sirius and NEC. Many of these large companies
made a one-time foray into the smartphone world (i.e. internal startups), and thus were not
included in this study of small companies. Several large corporations had subsidiaries or
slightly misspelled names, which caused them to erroneously show up in the small entity
population frame.
28. Charitable conglomerates, such as Intel-GE Care Innovations, provide useful
innovations to the public, often in the form of patents. Standards setting organizations, in this
database, mostly fell in the realm of telecommunications standards. These are often created
and proposed to a standards setting organization by multiple companies who then file a joint
patent.
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organizations were also pruned from the sample. Standards-essential patents
not owned directly by these large non-profit organizations would still be
captured in the sample.
Care was taken not to exclude large entities that were, until recently, small
players. To accomplish this, a historical records and news search was
conducted to determine whether the entity recently was in a startup funding
phase, was purchased by a larger corporation, suddenly expanded, or went
public. Likewise, small companies that recently went defunct and/or sold their
intellectual property to larger entities were maintained in the sample.
The sample was also pruned of patents and businesses that were clearly not
related to the design, software, hardware, or communications involved with
smartphones. The sample was also expressly filtered to exclude accessories to
smartphones such as batteries and cases, base-station technologies, server-side
technologies, and product packaging.
Lastly, the sample was filtered to exclude industrial wireless
communications innovations that were not related to smartphones, such as error
monitoring on pump jacks and vehicle fleets, or municipal communications
grids. Likewise, entities with patents for mesh networks were excluded unless
they dealt specifically with smartphones. Semiconductor companies that did not
market to smartphones were excluded as well.
In the process of pruning, several more random samples were extracted
from the population frame to achieve a data set comparable to the size of the
2012 Smartphone Patent Study. Of the 650 companies initially extracted as a
random sample for consideration, 46 companies and individual inventors
satisfied the filtering criteria and were retained for analysis as small
participants in the smartphone market. These small participants are listed in
Appendix A.
D. Collection of Publicly Available Data
For each of the 46 selected small market participants, a data set was
compiled using publicly available sources. The data consists of (1) the type of
business conducted by the companies; (2) contact information; (3) litigation
involving the company, both patent and non-patent; (4) acquisitions, funding,
and other investment information; (5) patents; (6) press releases and web
marketing related to patents. The following describes generally the information
collected and the public sources of data that were reviewed and cross-checked
for each category.
1. Type of businesses conducted: This data gives a brief overview
of the company’s main business and how, if at all, it is related to
smartphones. The information was used to evaluate each
company’s perceived impact on the target industry—smartphones.
The information was collected through the following online
resources: LinkedIn; CrunchBase; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; and
companies.findthebest.com.
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2. Contact information: The names of individuals at the target
companies including title of the person, address, phone number,
email, and website of the company, were collected where
available. This information was used to contact the companies to
administer the survey. This information was collected through the
following online resources: USPTO Public PAIR; LexisNexis;
Yahoo
Business;
Bloomberg
BusinessWeek;
and
companies.findthebest.com. Where this information was
unavailable, we attempted to contact the attorney that filed the
patent application in order to try to make contact with the patent
holder.
3. Litigation information: All U.S. court litigation where the small
participant companies were a party, including patent infringement
and non-patent cases, were collected and reviewed. This
information was used to determine how these companies interact
and conflict with each other using the U.S. court system. RPX
Corp., LexisNexis, and Bloomberg News databases were used to
identify the relevant litigations. In total, we identified and
reviewed thirty-eight patent lawsuits and twenty-two non-patent
ones.
4. Acquisition, funding, and other investment information:
Information regarding the date, amount, and participants in
mergers and acquisitions, rounds of funding, public stock
investments, and other investments were collected for each target
company. This information was compared to the patent data to
determine whether any correlation existed between patents and
investments. The information was collected from AngelList,
CBInsights.com,
Crunchbase.com,
Dealipedia.com,
BusinessWeek.com, edgar-online.com, BizJournals.com, and
Nasdaq.com.
5. Patents: A database of each target company’s patent portfolio was
collected and then compared to our database of smartphone-related
patents from which we chose our initial sample of target
companies. This information was mined from the bulk patent data
provided by the USPTO through Google’s and ReedTech’s
database retrieval tools found at google.com/patents and
patents.reedtech.com, respectively, as well as by strutpatent.com.
6. Press releases and web marketing: Publications by and about
each target company were retrieved and reviewed for discussion of
the company’s patent portfolio. This information was used to
gauge the perceived importance of each company’s patents as seen
by the companies themselves and in the public press. This
information was collected from Google News, Bloomberg News,
CrunchBase, and each company’s websites, where one or more
existed.
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E. Demographic Breakdown of the Sample
Table 8 shows the countries of origin for the 46 selected small participants.
Table 8 – Breakdown by Country

Country

Total

Canada
Israel
Netherlands
Sweden
Switzerland
US
Grand Total

2
1
1
2
1
39
46

The vast majority of the 46 selected small participant companies were
domestic U.S. companies or ones that had headquarters and strong ties in the
U.S. The seven foreign companies appear to be from known startup hubs. Israel
and Sweden are both well known for their startups and Switzerland’s “Silicon
Alps” is an up-and-coming startup hub. According to data compiled by
Washington State University College of Business, Canada ranks as one of the
top places to build a startup due to its high rate of post-secondary education,
low cost of living, and relatively flat rate of inflation. Amsterdam too has had
its fair share of startup successes. 29 For these reasons, it is not surprising that
our random sample pulled companies from these specific countries.
Similarly unsurprising is the distribution of the states of incorporation of
smartphone startups within the U.S. Table 9 shows this distribution. The largest
percentage (43.5%) is incorporated in Delaware. This compares to the
incorporation rates for other industries. In 2012, more that 50% of the major
corporations in the world were incorporated in that state. 30
Table 9 – Breakdown by State of Incorporation

29. Location,
Location,
Location,
WASH.
ST.
U.,
http://omba.wsu.edu/resources/infographics/infographic-location-location-location/
(last
visited Oct. 18, 2014).
30. Leslie Wayne, How Delaware Thrives as a Corporate Tax Haven, N.Y. TIMES
(Jun. 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/business/how-delaware-thrives-as-acorporate-tax-haven.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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Of the 46 chosen participants, 17 registered with the USPTO as large
organizations and 29 as small ones. Of the large organizations, seven changed
from small to large over the date range examined. Of the small ones, only one
changed from large to small. Therefore, at some point over the time period
studied, 78.3% of the chosen participants were registered as small. This is
reflected in Table 10 below.
Table 10 – Breakdown by Reported Size
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As of October 2014, most of the 46 selected small participants were still
alive in some form. Of the selected participants, 60.7% are still functioning or
have been acquired by a company that is still functioning; 9% have dissolved;
4% are dormant but not formally dissolved; and 13% are inventors in the
smartphone field who have not assigned their patent rights to a corporate
organization. 31 Table 11 shows this distribution.
Table 11 – Current State of Sample Companies

13%
4%

Functioning

9%

44%

Acquired
Dissolved
Dormant
Unincorporated Inventor

30%

For other demographic data, public information was not easy to find for
our selected sample because most of the sample consisted of small private
corporations (some foreign) or individual inventors with no public reporting
requirements. Only 9% of our sample companies were at some point public.
We were, nonetheless, able to collect detailed funding information totaling over
$2.8 billion for 63% of the selected companies. Of the 46 selected small

31. Companies classified as “Functioning” were those companies that were current on
their corporate filing fees in the place of incorporation or otherwise were still clearly doing
business (e.g. active website and/or sales). Companies classified as “Acquired” were
determined with reference to public information through AngelList, CBInsights.com,
Crunchbase.com, Dealipedia.com, BusinessWeek.com, edgar-online.com, BizJournals.com,
and Nasdaq.com. Companies classified as “Dissolved” were those companies that filed for
dissolution with the secretary of state in the place of incorporation. Companies classified as
“Dormant” were those companies that were delinquent on one or more filing fees in the
place of incorporation, allowed their website to go down for an extended period of time,
and/or were classified as such because press releases indicated the company was no longer
functioning. Companies classified as “Unincorporated Inventors” were those whose patents
were assigned directly to an inventor and not a corporate entity.
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participants, 47.8% received venture funding. A few of our participants also
received a mix of funding from government contracts, “Angels,” partial
acquisitions, full acquisitions, and joint ventures. Litigations are, for the most
part, public so that was more easily collected. Thirty-five percent of the study
participants were involved in some type of litigation including intellectual
property and other matters, as plaintiff or defendant. This is much lower than
the reported rate of litigation (82%) for U.S. companies and lower than the rate
of litigation for smaller companies (65%). 32
F. Survey
In addition to the data we collected from public sources, we sought direct
information from the 46 selected small participants. We constructed a survey to
collect information about the use and effect of smartphone patents from
individuals at the chosen companies. This survey is attached as Appendix B. 33
Survey respondents were offered the opportunity to remain anonymous.
But, even with that assurance, we received an insufficient number of responses
to perform any meaningful analysis.
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE MARKETPLACE

In this Part, we analyze the empirical data. First, we examine the
smartphone patent database as a whole. Then, we examine how patent
portfolios are built as a small player in the smartphone field begins to grow.
This examination looks at the relationship between smartphone business
activity and patent holdings, and at the relationship between overall business
activity and patent holdings. Next, we examine whether patent portfolios affect
the ability for small participants to secure funding. Finally, we investigate
32. In assessing litigation trends, Norton Rose Fulbright surveyed U.S. companies and
reported that in the U.S.: (1) 82% of companies had at least one suit filed during 2013; (2)
65% of smaller companies (those with less than $100 million in revenue) had at least one
suit filed. See Norton Rose Fulbright’s 10th Annual Litigation Trends: US companies
increasingly concerned about regulatory investigations, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Apr. 15,
2014),
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/115045/norton-rosefulbrights-10th-annual-litigation-trends.
33. We identified contact information for 41 of the firms that were selected for this
study. We began sending emails to these contacts on July 10, 2014. We sent a first reminder
email to the participants on July 22, 2014. Then, we began calling each company to solicit
responses on August 12, 2014. We continued calling the numbers that had had not been
disconnected, and for whom participants had not specifically opted out, until September 5,
2014. We sent a final reminder email on September 3, 2014 to the 35 participants that had
not yet responded to the survey and whose email addresses did not bounce back as
undeliverable on the first email attempt. All-in-all, and despite these efforts, the Fordham
CLIP received a very minimal response to the survey. Two companies agreed to submit
electronic survey responses, but only one in-fact did so, and one company provided off-therecord oral responses.
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whether patent litigation is helping, harming, or neutral to the small players.
A. Smartphone Business Activity and Patent Holdings
1. Analysis
From a high level taxonomy of the entire smartphone patent database
including all organizations holding any smartphone-related patents, it appears
that smartphone-related patents are concentrated with large companies.
Organizations that registered as large (i.e. with more than 500 employees) hold
90.4% of smartphone utility patents. 34 Broken down by type of patent, the
concentration of large corporations remains the same. Large corporations own
91.4%, 90.3%, and 88.4%, respectively, of the communications, hardware, and
software patents. 35 On average, a large corporation in the smartphone field has
1488 patents. By contrast, a small organization has an average of 61 patents
and a micro organization (though this designation is fairly new in the USPTO)
has an average of 3.4 patents.
Most smartphone-related utility patents are communications patents. There
are many more software patents than there are hardware patents, but both
categories represent a significant percentage of smartphone patent portfolios.
Table 12 shows this distribution.

34. See supra, section III.A.
35. The patent classification numbers that break down into these three categories,

communications, hardware, and software, are defined above in section II.B.
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Table 12 – Breakdown of Smartphone Utility Patents in Database36

Software
26%
Communicati
ons
58%
Hardware
16%

Our randomly selected sample of small players has a similar breakdown,
albeit with a few key differences as shown in Table 13 below. The basic
hierarchy is the same; communications represents the largest share followed by
software and then hardware. However, for our small players, there is a higher
percentage of communications patents and a very small percentage of hardware
patents.
Table 13 – Breakdown of Smartphone Patents in Sample

Software
12%

Hardware
2%

Design
6%

Communicati
ons
80%

Among the 46 selected small participants, those that have been acquired or
are still functioning had, on average, a larger portfolio. Similarly, the median
portfolio size for acquired companies was noticeably larger than those for all
36. Design patents are not shown here for the overall database because the separate
database that was constructed for the 2012 Smartphone Patent Study was over-inclusive to
account for the uncertainty of design classifications.
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other dispositions. However, an outlier in the functioning category meant that
the median for functioning companies was slightly lower than the median
holdings for dissolved companies. This is shown in Table 14. The category of
patents a company has does not seem to matter for the company’s long-term
outcome. All the companies that were dissolved or are now dormant only had a
small number of communications patents. Of the sample, 60% of the
companies had only communications patents in their portfolios, 13% had only
software patents, 2.2% had only hardware patents, and 2.2% had only design
patents. This means that only 22.6% of selected small participants had a
diversified portfolio.
Table 14 – Patent Categories and Business Survival
18
16

Avg. Patents

14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Communications
Software
Hardware
Design
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8
7

Median Patents

6
5

Communications

4

Software
Hardware

3

Design
2
1
0
Acquired

Functioning Unincorporated
Inventor

Dissolved

Dormant

2. Impact
The demographics of the small participants with patents indicate that they
have a surprisingly strong survival rate. Studies show that between 40% and
90% of all types of startups in the United States fail, depending on the
industry. 37 While these studies do not distinguish between startups with patents
and those without, the failure rate of the small participants that have patents in
the smartphone industry (as measured by dissolution or dormancy over the six
year period between 2006-2012) was only 13%. 38 This suggests that the small
participants in the smartphone industry with one or more patents are
significantly more stable than startups in general. 39

37. Faisal Hoque, Why Most Venture Backed Companies Fail, FAST COMPANY (Dec.
10, 2012, 6:02 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3003827/why-most-venture-backedcompanies-fail; Startup Business Failure Rate By Industry, STATISTIC BRAIN,
http://www.statisticbrain.com/startup-failure-by-industry/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2014); Glen
Dalakian II, 90% of Tech Startups Fail, WAMDA (Feb. 7, 2013),
http://www.wamda.com/2013/02/90-percent-of-tech-startups-fail-infographic; Scott Shane,
BUSINESS
TRENDS
(Apr.
28,
2008),
Startup
Failure
Rates,
SMALL
http://smallbiztrends.com/2008/04/startup-failure-rates.html.
38. See supra, Tables 11 and 14 and accompanying text. Recognizing that there are
other possible instances that may be considered failures, including bankruptcy restructuring,
unfavorable acquisitions, or a complete lack of market share growth, the study examined the
publicly available data and did not find any other significant events indicating apparent
“failure” in this sample.
39. Failure rates specific to start-ups holding patents are not available; and thus, a
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While the overall failure rate of the small participants was extremely low,
the failures seemed to be concentrated in participants holding a small number
of communications patents. 40 Table 14 illustrates that those small participants
with more diversified portfolios, or with a large number, of smartphone patents
had a better chance of business survival. For those companies that were
dissolved or went dormant, half formally assigned all their patents to another
company, while the disposition of the patents of the other half could not be
ascertained. 41 The unknown disposition of patents for half the failed companies
may reflect either an abandonment of the patent or an unrecorded assignment.
In any case, the recorded assignments of eight of the nineteen smartphone
patents held by failed companies indicate that smartphone patents are still an
important asset to be salvaged from a company’s failure. That some companies
took the time to perfect their assignment by filing it with the USPTO (eight
patents in total) provides an indication that these smartphone patents had
ongoing value despite the company failures.
While design patents are also part of a well-diversified portfolio, small
participants in our sample did not typically include design patents in their
portfolios. Our sample companies and inventors had, on average, less than one
design patent each, and only 8.6% of the sample had a design patent. The rarity
of design patents may be because the small participants are rarely large enough
to manufacture, sell, and distribute a physical consumer product. It is also
possible that, to protect the outward appearance of a product, companies simply
rely on trademark and trade dress law.

direct comparison for patent holding start-ups and patent holding smartphone market
participants is not possible.
40. For our sample of small participants, communications patents are clearly the most
important and sought-after patents in the field. Communications patents have, at their heart,
a theoretical and cognitive element that does not always require the application of expensive
machinery to invent. Reducing hardware to practice—whether it is a consumer device or
component for another business to use—is more expensive. This may explain the difference
between the relative portfolios of the small and large players. It may also be that
participation in the various communications standards-setting organizations is lucrative
enough to incentivize even small companies to focus their efforts in that area. While
designing around software and hardware patents may be possible, communications patents
are often incorporated into standards, such as 4G LTE, and may be more difficult to avoid.
This study did not identify whether any patents were declared essential to a standard. A prior
study found that less than one third of smartphone patents in litigation were declared
essential to a standard, concluding that “the smart phone patent wars do not appear to be
driven by SEPs . . . .” Kirti Gupta & Mark Snyder, Smart Phone Litigation and Standard
Essential Patents, HOOVER IP WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 14006 (May 16, 2014), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2492331.
41. Of the six companies in the sample that were dissolved or dormant, three (Wisair,
ORO Grande Technology, and ISP Operator) assigned all of their smartphone patents to
another company while the disposition of the patents for the other three (Samhain Union,
incNetworks, NexStep) is not known. The USPTO assignment database for the eleven
patents held by Samhain Union, incNetworks, or NexStep contains no information on the
disposition of the patents.
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B. Overall Business Activity and Patent Portfolios
To understand the overall business activity of the small market participants
in our sample, we examined the complete patent portfolios including nonsmartphone related patents and sought to understand the impact of the
portfolios on the small participants’ competitiveness.
1. Analysis
Many of the 46 selected small smartphone market participants also have
patents in fields other than smartphones. This means that their business
activities are not exclusively, and possibly not predominantly, in the
smartphone market. Overall, only 41% of the patent portfolios owned by the
entities in the sample are smartphone-related patents. On average, the small
participants have twenty-two patents granted and thirty-two patents filed. The
median number of patents granted, however, is only eleven, with the largest
number of companies in the four to ten patent range. A few entities in the
sample with very large portfolios (specifically, SiRF with 268 and Newport
Media with 116 patents) skew the average to appear higher. Table 15 shows
this frequency distribution of utility patent grants and filings.

Number of Companies

Table 15 – Total Utility Patent Grants and Filings
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Grants
Filings

1-3 Patents

4-10
Patents

11-20
Patents

21-50
Patents

51-100
Patents

>100
Patents

With respect to the overall types of patents held by the small
participants in the smartphone market, they appear to keep their portfolios
balanced between smartphone patents and other patents, as seen in Table 16
below. We examined this balance by running a statistical correlation analysis to
determine whether our sample participants favor smartphone patents over nonsmartphone related patents while growing their portfolios. The correlation
coefficient between the arrays of the number of smartphone patents per entity
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and the number of other patents is 0.84 with a coefficient of determination (r2)
of 70.5%. 42 This correlation shows that small players in the smartphone market
generally keep the number of smartphone patents in their portfolio in similar
proportion to the number of non-smartphone patents.
Table 16 – Patent Distribution
250
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100
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20

50
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0

0
Smartpone Patents

Non-Smartphone Patents

In terms of business continuity, Table 17 below shows the outcomes based
on the size of the patent portfolio. Of the sample participants with ten or more
patents, eight were acquired and six are still functioning. None of these small
participants appear to be dissolved or dormant. In other words, companies with
ten or more patents tend to survive. With respect to the companies that own one
to three patents, these market participants are distributed fairly evenly among
the categories with the largest portion still functioning. 43

42. The correlation coefficient here is used to measure the direction and strength of the
linear relationship between these two variables: smartphone patents and other patents. This
coefficient is between -1 and 1. The closer the coefficient is to 1 or -1, the stronger the
relationship between the variables. If it is close to zero, there is no correlation. A coefficient
of greater than .8 generally indicates a strong correlation. If the coefficient is positive, it
means that the two values tend to change in the same direction. If it is negative, they tend to
change in opposite directions. The square of the coefficient (referred to as the “coefficient of
determination”) is the measure of how often of the variance of one variable is predictable by
a change in the other.
43. The instance of lapsed utility patent maintenance fees is very low in our sample,
indicating the continued operation of the patent holder. Seventy four percent of the sample
did not miss a fee; all of their patents are in good standing. Five out of the twelve companies
(42%) that allowed one or more patent fees to lapse were acquired by another company;
three are still functioning; and only three appear to be dormant or dissolved. All but one have
other patents in their portfolio for which fees are in good standing. Design patents have no
maintenance fees, so no data about their retention is available.

400

STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:375
Table 17 – Outcome Based on Number of Patents

1 to 3 smartphone patents
Dissolved, Dormant
Unincorporated Inventor

4 to 9 smartphone patents

Acquired
Functioning
10 or more smartphone
patents
0%

50%

100%

2. Impact
The juxtaposition of patent holdings with business activity indicates that a
larger patent portfolio correlates to a higher likelihood of business survival.
None of the companies with ten or more smartphone patents in their portfolio
appear to have stopped functioning during the study period. By contrast, nearly
20% of the companies with fewer than three patents appear to have failed; the
remaining companies with fewer than three patents appear to be still
functioning or have been acquired. Table 17 reveals similarly that the
companies with four to six patents fail more frequently than those with larger
portfolios. After ten patents, a company’s survival rate increases dramatically. 44
But, this may simply indicate that companies with more funding obtain more
patents. 45 This may show that there is a benefit to having patents for the
survival of a business and coupled with the findings in Table 18 that show
increases in patent prosecution during fundraising, patents do appear to
correlate with business survival. We examine the relationship between funding
and patents in Part IV.C below.
The research also indicates that small market participants rarely focus
exclusively on smartphones. Though we have identified companies and

44. This study found no correlation between the age of a company and the number of
patents it held. A regression analysis yielded an r2 of 0.002 for the correlation between the
age of a company and the number of smartphone patents that it owned and an r2 of 0.02 for
the correlation between the age of a company and the total number of patents (including nonsmartphone patents) that it owned.
45. A recent study conducted by data analytics firm CB Insights strongly suggests that
the amount of funding a company raises is strongly correlated with the likelihood of its
survival. 55% of startup companies that failed had raised less than $1 million. The R.I.P.
(Jan.
18,
2014),
Report
–
Startup
Death
Trends,
CBINSIGHTS
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/startup-death-data/.
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individuals that have a small presence in the smartphone market place, only
41% of the patents in their portfolios were smartphone patents. The available
websites for the 46 selected small participants reveals that most of the small
participants have other products and markets outside the smartphone field. For
example, 82.6% of the sample had patents in non-smartphone patent
classifications; of the remainder, 6.5% were individual inventors. Only a small
portion of the sample (10.9%) were companies that patented technologies
solely related to smartphones. 46
With respect to design patents, the trends are similar to the industry as a
whole. The small participants do not obtain design patents nearly as often as
utility patents, and they rarely obtain design patents. As a general matter,
design patents are valuable to protect the external designs of consumer-facing
products, and the small participants typically do not offer consumer products.
The small participants will often sell their products to other businesses, or their
consumer product is software, not a physical product. This may be one reason
design patents are rare among small players. Another reason may be that there
is relatively little jurisprudence covering design patents, as compared to utility
patents. Enforcing a design patent (unless it is so iconic and necessary to the
success of a company) is complicated when compared to trademark and trade
dress assertions.
Hence, on average, a small participant has less than one (0.83) design
patent in its portfolio. All but five of the small participants (89%) in the sample
have no design patents at all. The rare small participants that do have design
patents, such as Control4 and Intertel, have a collection of design patents. Not
surprisingly, Control4 and Intertel are manufacturers of hardware for end-users.
Control4 manufactures smart-home equipment, 47 and Intertel makes business
phones 48 as well as other types of end-user products for businesses. One
unincorporated inventor, Michael Townsend, has only design patents in his
portfolio for touch screen user interfaces. Interestingly, design patents may be
seen as an inexpensive benefit. One respondent to the survey indicated that his
company was considering applying for a design patent because it is
“inexpensive and potentially useful.” 49 That company, despite being a
hardware business with 80% of its patents related to smartphones, has no
design patents currently.
Of additional note, the data does not indicate any significant hindrance for
small participants from utility patent maintenance fees. Patent fees are

46. This relationship appears to persist as companies grow their overall portfolio of
patents. See supra, Table 16 and accompanying text.
47. See CONTROL4, http://www.control4.com/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2014).
48. See INTERTEL PHONES, http://www.intertel-phones.com/ (last visited Oct. 31,
2014).
49. Survey response.
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generally not high, 50 and the majority of lapsed patent maintenance fees do not
appear to be the result of financial difficulties. Companies appear to allow
some of their patents to lapse while preserving others in their portfolios. This
makes sense if patents generally have a value greater than the cost of the
maintenance fees. 51 Other companies appear to choose to move their businesses
in a different direction. Some instance of lapsed fees for profitable companies
may simply be due to oversight or clerical error.
C. Smartphone Patents and Funding
1. Analysis
The overwhelming majority of the corporate entities among the small
participants were founded during or after 2000. 52 The relationship, thus,
between patents and funding for small participants may provide an important
indicator of the openness of the smartphone market.
The data shows that twenty-nine (or 63%) of the sample participants
received some form of funding over the period studied, including seventeen
entities that received at least one series of venture or “angel” funding. 53 On
50. United States Patent And Trademark Office Fee Schedule, USPTO,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee010114.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2014).
51. Patents can lose value if they are found - either through litigation, due diligence, or
by other contact from an interested party - to be unenforceable. Some companies may also
choose to dedicate their patented technologies to the public.
52. Of the forty corporate entities in the data set, 70% (twenty-eight) were founded
after 2000. By contrast, many of the key large participants in the 2012 Smartphone Patent
Study were incorporated many years earlier:

Research in Motion
Apple
Samsung
Microsoft
Nokia
Google
Motorola
Sony
Huawei
Broadcom

1984
1976
1938
1975
1871
1998
1928
1946
1987
1991

Of the twenty-eight companies in the sample that only came into existence in the year 2000
or later, eighteen received some form of funding during the period studied (64.3%). Of the
twelve corporate entities that were less than ten years old, seven received funding (58.3%).
53. The data shows similar results for the subset of small participants that are truly
small companies, rather than larger companies that have small forays into the smartphone
market. Of the companies that registered as small companies, fifteen (51.7%) received some
form of funding.
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average, these small participants had 1.41 patents granted and 4.45 patents filed
before their first funding event. After the final round of funding, 79% of these
participants (twenty-three of the twenty-nine) stopped filing for patents. Indeed,
after the final round of funding, the average number of patent filings for all
participants was only 0.79 patents per participant. Table 18 shows the
relationship between patents and the first and last funding events.
Table 18 – Average Number of Smartphone Patents
5.00
4.50
4.00

Patents

3.50
3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
Filed Before First Funding
Event

Granted Before First
Funding Event

Filed After Last Funding
Event

Patent prosecution in our sample picks up during the periods between
funding events, in particular right before the first funding event and before an
exit event. The companies that received funding showed an average of 2.4
patent filings during the six months before a funding event and 4.7 patent
filings during the twelve-month period before a funding event. At least one
patent application was filed by 37.9% of the companies six months before a
funding event, and 44.8% of the companies filed at least one patent application
within the twelve months prior to a funding event. Participants that received
funding filed fewer patent applications after the events, with an average of 1.9
patents during the six months after a funding event (with 34.5% filing at least
one patent) and an average of 3.3 patents during the year after (with 51.7%
filing a patent).
To better understand the points at which companies choose to seek patents,
we examined patent prosecution activity more closely. Table 19 presents the
patent filings of each small participant in relation to the timing of the funding
events. We focus on the last funding event or “exit” event to determine if these
generate greater activity than other funding events.
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Table 19 – Patents Before Exit Event54
Number of Patents
Granted Before Exit
Event

Airwalk Communications

9

Augme Technologies, Inc.

2

Bitstream Inc.

3

Cellemetry, LLC
Cequint, Inc.
Control4 Corporation
Core Mobility, Inc.
Cortina Systems, Inc.
Daylife, Inc.

0
4
22
16
21
2

Inter-Tel, Inc.

5

LiveWire Mobile, Inc.

1

Nethra Imaging Inc.

2

Newport Media, Inc.
PureDepth Inc.
SIRF Technology, Inc.
StarHome GmbH

60
0
27
11

Strix Systems, Inc.

7

Ubinetics Ltd.

2

Varia Mobil LLC
Veveo, Inc.
XG Technology, Inc.
Average

4
27
27
16.14

Number of Patents
Granted Before
Previous Event
4
0
4
20
1
0
1
0
7
0
0
4
0
1
5

Difference
5
0
0
2
20
2
0
2
53
27
11
3
2
26
22
11.7

For exit events, nearly a majority of the small market participants in the
sample, twenty-two (48%), experienced an exit event (either by acquisition or
by initial public offering). On average, these twenty-two companies had 15.4
patents filed before the exit event occurred. The above data shows a run-up to
obtain a larger number of patents right before the exit event. Companies that
had a regular funding event prior to their exit event acquired, on average,
another 11.7 patents shortly before they were acquired or went public.
While increases in the number of patents correlate to funding and exit
events, the amount of money raised by those events does not correlate to the
54. A “-” indicates that there was no previous event; the acquisition or IPO was the
only funding event for this participant.
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number of patents. Table 20 below shows that the funding amount and the
number of granted patents before that event rarely move together. The
correlation is very weak at 0.127. This correlation means that 1.6% (0.1272) of
variance between the funding amount and the number of patents is related.
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$800.00

60

$700.00

Millions

Table 20 – Correlation Between Funding and Smartphone Patents
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$100.00

0

$0.00
Patents Granted Before Event

Funding Amount

There are, however, two very clear outliers: one a very high number of
patents and one a very high funding amount. If the two outliers are removed,
the correlation improves but only slightly as illustrated in Table 21 below.
Without these outliers, the correlation coefficient is 0.312 (9.7% of variance is
related); this does not indicate meaningful correlation.
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Table 21 – Correlation Between Funding and Smartphone Patents
Excluding Outliers
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$0.00

0
Patents Granted Before Event

Funding Amount

The r correlation improves slightly to 0.192 when patent filings are
considered rather than patent grants. With the two outliers removed, the r
correlation between the amount of funding in respective funding events and the
number of patent filings before those events is 0.41, another weak correlation
coefficient.
To rule out funding bias based on age, we ran a correlation analysis on age
versus funding. The amount of funding that a company received does not
appear to be a function of a company’s age. A regression analysis of all eightyfive recorded funding events shows no correlation between age and amount.
The r2 was very weak at 0.014 and was even weaker than the correlation
between the number of patents and funding amount. However, an outlier (a
funding amount of $732 million) caused the statistical significance to fall
below a reliable threshold. With the outlier funding event removed, the
statistical significance of the regression was restored and the r2 rose slightly to
.084, which is still a weak correlation and which does not show a connection.
The age of a company, thus, does not appear to be a good predictor for the
amount of funding the company will receive nor does age create funding bias.
2. Impact
The data shows that small participants in the smartphone market with
patents significantly outperform startups in general in their fund-raising
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success. 55 According to one study, 0.05% of startups receive venture funding
and 0.91% of startups receive angel funding. 56 In our sample, 63% received
funding totaling $2.8 billion. In every measure we used to isolate the truly
small companies from the small participants in the market that were actually
part of large organizations, the data still showed more than half of the entities
with smartphone patents receiving some form of funding. Moreover, 50% of
our sample received more than one round of funding; and split between the
twenty-nine companies that received funding, the funding received averaged
$96,551, which exceeds the startup industry average of $78,406. 57
As our data showed, a company’s ability to build its smartphone patent
portfolio correlates with the company’s ability to raise funds but not the amount
of funds raised in each round. Though there is no causal relationship between
the number of patents and the amount of funding, the companies’ actions show
that they perceive this connection between patents and funding. The data also
shows that age alone does not correlate with higher (or lower) funding
amounts. The sample companies exhibited a common pattern in timing for
prosecuting patents. 58 The companies in the sample began to build patent
portfolios, then sought funding, and then had an opportunity to operate in the
market or merge with larger companies. Between funding rounds, companies
increase their patents filings. According to the data, the small participants
typically increased their acquisitions of patents at a significant level beginning
twelve months before obtaining funding. This indicates that patented
innovation increases a company’s ability to survive in the marketplace. After
their final funding event (an acquisition, or an IPO), companies then
significantly reduce their smartphone patent filings.
This trend among the small participants indicates that the patent right
serves as an important asset for small participants to enter the smartphone
market. The patent right appears to strengthen the small participants’ existence
and to strengthen the small participants ability to compete for necessary
funding. The small participants also perceive the patent right as an important
signaling marker for the company. Of the forty corporate entities in our sample,
twenty-five (62.5%), mentioned patents somewhere on their own website. 59
This also indicates that companies value their patent portfolio as a means to

55. According to a Money Tree study, venture capitalists entered only 3,995 deals
totaling about $29 billion in 2013, an increase of 7% over the previous year. Jeffrey
Davidson & Laura Cruz, Annual venture investment dollars rise 7% and exceed 2012 totals,
PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPER (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/pressreleases/2014/annual-venture-investment-dollars.jhtml.
56. Laura Entis, Where Startup Funding Really Comes From, ENTREPRENEUR (Nov.
20, 2013), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/230011.
57. Id.
58. See supra, Tables 20 and 21
59. This percentage does not include the unincorporated inventors; six companies had
no patent info and eight websites were down or otherwise unavailable.
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entice interest from customers or investors. 60
Corporate mergers and acquisitions also give circumstantial evidence that
patent rights provide access to market presence for small participants. For
example, three of our selected companies were bought by larger organizations.
CSR, a large UK-based semiconductor company, bought SiRF (a participant in
our sample) for $136 million in stock. SiRF was a very active innovator and
held 305 patents of which eighty-three were smartphone patents. CSR also
bought Ubinetics (another sample participant) for $48 million in cash.
Ubinetics was a less active innovator and only held twelve patents, of which
three were smartphone patents. The third company, Intertel, was acquired by
Mitel for $723 million. At the time of the acquisition, Intertel had a total of
thirty-three patents, of which thirteen were smartphone patents. The patent
rights appeared to be significant components of the acquisition strategies for all
the companies involved.
Lastly, the finding that companies significantly slowed or ceased filing for
patents following the last funding round may be attributed to a variety of
factors. The companies may simply have stopped innovating and shifted focus
to other areas such as product manufacturing, customer acquisition and
retention or sales. Alternatively, the companies might have switched to a trade
secret-based business model once certain financial thresholds were reached. Or,
companies may have begun to file under other names once they have sufficient
financial stability, such as through the name of a patent holding subsidiary.
And, it may also be possible that once financial stability was established,
companies simply began purchasing patent rights from others rather than
generating new patentable inventions from within. Finally, the reduction in
patent filings may be less pronounced than the data indicates. This is due to the
possibility that the data may be incomplete if some companies changed their
names after they were acquired or if the entities themselves acquired another
company. Nevertheless, there is a marked and unexplained slowdown in patent
acquisition even among companies that are still functioning under the same
name.
D. Typology of Litigation
We examined all the litigation involving the small market participants in

60. Anecdotally, it also seems that seeking investment is a top reason for seeking
patent rights. One survey respondent noted that the most important impact of smartphone
patents on his business was the “[a]bility to negotiate with much more powerful business
entities.” One survey respondent indicated that it used its patents only “when seeking
funding” for the business and had sought funds more than ten times in the last three years.
That respondent had never asserted infringement of its patents, in or out of court, or used its
patents in advertisement for customers. The other survey respondent stated that his or her
company used smartphone patents only in seeking investments and in informal assertions
(e.g. cease and desist letters) against competitors.
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our sample to understand how suits affected their market presence.
1. Analysis
In total, the fourty-six selected small participants were parties in sixty
lawsuits–thirty-two as plaintiffs and twenty-eight as defendants. Thus, in terms
of litigation, the average entity saw 1.3 suits with 35% of the companies
involved in one or more public lawsuits.
Few of these suits, however, involved patents, and even fewer involved
smartphone patents. The total number of patent-related suits for all the
companies was thirty-eight. Yet, those suits were concentrated among ten small
participants, and the remaining thirty-six participants (78%) were not involved
in any patent litigation. 61 Of the ten companies that were involved in some
form of patent litigation, all but one are still functioning or have been acquired.
On average, the small participants had less than one (0.83) suit each. Only six
of the companies were defendants in a patent suit. 62 Of the twenty-three suits
where our sample companies were plaintiffs, only four of the suits asserted
smartphone patents. 63 Of the fifteen suits where our sample companies were
defendants in patent litigation, twelve included one or more patents with a
smartphone patent classification, all of which were in the “communications”
category. 64
61. See supra section III.E (35% of small companies have no suits of any type.).
62. The following six companies from the sample were defendants in a patent

litigation: 1) Wisair; 2) SiRF Technology; 3) Strix Systems.; 4) LiveWire Mobile; 5) Augme
Technologies.; and 6) Control4. The following thirteen companies were plaintiffs in
litigations adverse to the above defendants: 1) Broadcom; 2) Global Locate; 3) Linex
Technologies.; 4) Callertone Innovations; 5) LucidMedia Networks; 6) Velti; 7) Sipco; 8)
Lutron; 9) US Ethernet Innovations; 10) Olivistar; 11) Inncom International; 12) Azure
Networks; and 13) Tri-County Excelsior Foundation. We did not undertake the qualitative
and subjective determination of whether the patents asserted against our sample were closely
enough related to the smartphone industry. However, from a high level analysis, most of the
patents were closely related with assertions of GPS, data communications, and caller ID
patents.
63. The following seven companies from the sample were plaintiffs in a patent
litigation: 1) Nonend Inventions; 2) Cequint; 3) StarHome; 4) SiRF Technology; 5) Veveo;
6) Augme Technology.; and 7) Varia Mobil.
64. See supra section III.B, Tables 3-5; Linex Techs. v. Motorola, Inc., et al., No.
9:05-CV-80300); Global Locate, Inc. v. SiRF Tech., Inc. et al., No. 4:06-CV-06964 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 14, 2006); Lutron Elecs. Co., Inc. v. Control4 Corp., No. 2:06-CV-00401, 2009
WL 137170 (D. Utah Jan. 20, 2009); Global Locate v. SiRF. Tech., Inc. (ITC Inv. No. 337TA-602); Broadcom Corp. v. SiRF Tech., Inc., No. 8:08-CV-00546, 2009 WL 8591845
(C.D. Cal. July 20, 2009); Inncom Int’l Inc. v. Control4 Corp., No. 3:09-cv-00649-CFD (D.
Conn. 2009); Broadcom Corp. v. CSR plc et al., No. 8:10-CV-01662 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13,
2011); Callertone Innovations LLC v. U.S. Cellular Corp. et al., No. 1:11-CV-01068; Sipco,
LLC v. Control4 Corp., No. 1:11-CV-0612-JEC, 2012 WL 526074 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 16,
2012); Azure Networks LLC et al. v. Samsung Telecomms. America LLC et al., No. 6:12CV-00745; U.S. Ethernet Innovations, LLC v. Cirrus Logic, Inc., No. 6:12-CV-00366, 2013
WL 8482270 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2013); Wilan, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 3:14-CV-01507 (S.D.

410

STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:375

Several of the small participants in this study brought patent infringement
claims against large companies, including some identified in the 2012
Smartphone Patent Study as “key” participants. For example, Nonend
Inventions N.V. sued Spotify (a music services company that had three million
paying users at the time) for infringement of Nonend’s patents covering content
streaming. 65 Another small player, Cequint, Inc., sued Apple for infringement
of Cequint’s patents covering advanced caller identification technology. 66
Augme Technologies, Inc. sued Yahoo, Pandora, and others for infringing on
Augme’s patents covering a process for adding functionality to a web page. 67
Of the six small participants in the smartphone market that were defendants
in patent litigation, three were registered with the USPTO as large
corporations 68 and three as small ones. 69 These three “small” participants,
Augme Technologies, Control4, and Strix Systems, are now fairly large
successful companies, though some with only small smartphone-related
ventures. Augme Technologies, for example, acquired Hipcricket and now,
operating under that name, reported revenue of $7.3 million in the first fiscal
quarter of 2014. 70 Though currently operating at a deficit, Hipcricket does not
appear to fault patent litigation for any of its losses and in fact lists patent
litigation as an asset in its public filings. 71 Control4 has over three hundred
employees and generated revenue of $109.5 million in 2012. 72 Strix systems in

Cal. June 23, 2014).
65. Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, Nonend Inventions N.V. v. Spotify USA Inc.
et al., No. 1:13-CV-00389 (D. Del. Mar. 8, 2013), available at
https://search.rpxcorp.com/lit/dedce-51308-nonend-inventions-nv-v-spotify (last visited Oct.
18, 2014); Dawn McCarty, Spotify Sued by Nonend Over Technology for Music Sharing,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 17, 2012, 12:06 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0817/spotify-sued-by-nonend-over-technology-for-music-sharing.html.
66. Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, Cequint Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 1:11-CV01224 (D. Del. Dec. 12, 2011), available at https://search.rpxcorp.com/lit/dedce-47651cequint-v-apple (last visited Oct. 18, 2014); Wolfgang Gruener, Cequint Sues Apple Over
GUIDE
(Dec.
14,
2011,
8:00
AM),
Advanced
Caller
ID,
TOM’S
http://www.tomsguide.com/us/patent-infringement-lawsuit-apple-iphone,news-13503.html.
67. Augme Techs., Inc. v. Tacoda LLC, No. 1:07-CV-07088, 2011 WL 5547983
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2011) (Tacoda was in the middle of being acquired by AOL when this
lawsuit was filed.); Augme Techs., Inc. v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 09-05386-JCS, 2012 WL
3627408 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2012); Augme Techs., Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. 1:11CV-00379, 2012 WL 6055010 (D. Del. Dec. 5, 2012); Augme Techs., Inc. v. Gannett Co.,
No. 1:11-CV-05193; 2011 WL 3207118 (E.D. Va. July 26, 2011); Augme Techs. Inc. v.
Velti USA Inc., No. 1:12-CV-00294 (D. Del. Mar. 9, 2012); Augme Techs. Inc. v.
Millennial Media Inc., No. 1:12-CV-00429 (D. Del. Apr. 5, 2012).
68. See supra note 12.
69. See supra note 18.
70. Hipcricket, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) at 12 (July 20, 2011), available at
http://a.aug.me/augmeimg/44000/43235.pdf. (Augme/Hipcricket has brought patent
infringement actions against AOL, Time Warner Cable, and Yahoo Inc.).
71. Id. at 11.
72. Control4, INC., http://www.inc.com/profile/control4 (last visited Oct. 18, 2014).
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2007 held the top two positions in the number of nodes and radios shipped in
terms of both revenues and market share. 73 One of the six defendants among
the small participants in the sample, Wisair Ltd., seems to be no longer
functioning, 74 while the other five are either active or acquired. 75
Non-practicing entities are largely absent from litigation involving the
small participants. 76 Of the twelve plaintiffs who brought smartphone patent
law suits against the small participants in our sample, five were listed by RPX
as NPEs . 77 Of those few sample participants that were involved in litigation
with a NPE (8.7%), all but one were named as co-defendants in a suit where the
primary defendant was a large corporation, including Apple and Samsung. 78
The companies that defended patent infringement suits against a NPE also
tended to have large portfolios of patents themselves. 79
A study by Professor Chien using NPE litigation data for high-tech patents
from the Stanford Intellectual Property Litigation Clearinghouse (IPLC) shows
a similar result. 80 According to her study, 76% of all high-tech patent suits
were brought by public or private corporations, and among industries, the range
was 71-84%. Individuals initiated 5% of suits and nonprofits 1%. That left the
NPE share at 17%, including 8% of all hardware suits, 20% software suits, and
23% of all financial suits. 81 Therefore, among the technology suits (hardware
and software), NPEs brought only 14% of all the high-tech patents lawsuits.
This is slightly higher than our figure of 8.7% for the narrower class of
smartphone patents. Contrary to popular perception, the percentage of NPE73. News Spotlight, STRIX SYSTEMS, http://www.strixsystems.com/newsspotlight.aspx
(last visited Oct. 18, 2014).
74. Azure Networks and Tri-County Excelsior Foundation added Wisair and several
other technology companies as defendants to an amended complaint in a lawsuit initially
brought against Samsung. Though Wisair was named as a defendant, there is no indication
that the lawsuit had any meaningful impact on Wisair’s ability to function or contributed to
Wisair’s demise. Even if this one litigation were damaging to Wisair, it would stand alone as
an outlier in our study as the only company so adversely affected by smartphone patent
litigation.
75. These observations were made as of October 2014.
76. Non-practicing entities (NPEs) involved in patent litigation are identified by RPX
and listed in the database of litigations. Their status was determined by reference to the RPX
database of annotated litigations, which is: available at http://www.rpxcorp.com/.
77. 1) Azure Networks; 2) Linex Technologies, Inc.; 3) Callertone Innovations; 4)
Sipco; and 5) U.S. Ethernet Innovations.
78. Sipco, LLC v. Control4 Corp (1:11-CV-00612); Olivistar, LLC v. Control4
Corporation (2:14-CV-00393).
79. The following 4 companies from the sample were sued by an NPE for alleged
infringement of smartphone patent: 1) Wisair; 2) Strix Systems; 3) LiveWire Mobile; and 4)
Control4.
80. Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and
Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 1571 (2009). Here, hightech patents refer to hardware, software, and financial patents based on the USPTO patent
classification of the litigated patents. See id. at 1593-94.
81. Id. at 1600.
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initiated lawsuits is lower than anticipated.
Of the forty-six small participants in the sample, two (4.3%) were
identified as an NPE themselves. 82 Both of these companies initiated patent
lawsuits against very large companies, but not against other small players.
In all, only 6.5% of the small participants were sued for patent
infringement by an operating company. There is also only one instance of a
large actor identified in the 2012 Smartphone Patent Study suing a small
participant. 83
2. Impact
Patent litigation itself does not seem to be a major threat for small
participants in the smartphone field. Twenty-two percent of the small
participants in our sample were involved in patent litigation at some point from
their inception through October 2014. However, of those only half (11%) of the
small participants were named as defendants in a suit where a smartphone
patent had been asserted. And of those 5 companies, only two (4%) were
named as a defendant directly while the others were named as co-defendants in
a suit where the primary defendant was a large corporation. 84 With regard to
NPEs the data is similar, with only one member out of 46 from the sample
facing an NPE directly in patent litigation. This data does not indicate that these
lawsuits adversely affected any of the small participants’ ability to function in
the smartphone market. 85 The data does suggest, however, that a strategy of
amassing a defensive patent portfolio would be unnecessary. Neither large
industry players nor non-practicing entities appear to have much of an interest
in suing small participants for patent infringement.
By contrast, there are several instances where small participants have used
their patents against large companies as a method of obtaining compensation
for their innovations. 86 On the reverse side, some litigation appears to result in

82. The following two companies in the sample were identified by RPX corp. as
NPEs: 1) Nonend Inventions; and 2) Augme Techs.
83. Broadcomm sued a relatively small market participant—SiRF—for patent
infringement related to GPS. SiRF was a semiconductor manufacturing company.
Broadcomm later named SiRF in another patent lawsuit against CSR, a much larger
semiconductor company which had acquired SiRF.
84. Global Locate, Inc. v. SIRF Technology, Inc. et al. No. 4:06-CV-06964; Global
Locate v. Sirf. Tech, Inc. (ITC Inv. No. 337-TA-602); Lutron Elecs. Co. v. Control4 Corp.,
No. 2:06-CV-00401; Broadcom Corporation v. SiRF Technology Inc No. 8:08-CV-00546;
Inncom Intl Inc v. Control4 Corp No.3:09-CV-00649; Sipco, LLC v. Control4 Corp, No.
1:11-CV-00612; Olivistar, LLC v. Control4 Corporation, No. 2:14-CV-00393.
85. No company publicly attributed any financial difficulties to patent litigation.
86. See e.g., Veveo, Inc. v. Verizon Services Corp. et al., No. 1:10-CV-06709
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2010); Cequint Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 1:11-CV0-01224 (D. Del. 2013);
Augme Technologies Inc. v. Pandora Media Inc., No. 1:11-CV-00379; Augme Techs., Inc.
v. Yahoo!, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2012); Augme Techs., Inc. v.
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the acquisition of the defendant. For example, Bitstream was acquired by
Monotype imaging, which had previously sued Bitstream for patent
infringement. Likewise, in the midst of litigation with Broadcomm, SiRF was
acquired by the much larger semiconductor company CSR. This acquisition
was not directly related to the litigation as the purchase was part of a strategy
for CSR to become “a connectivity centre for everything from bluetooth to FM
radio, GPS and near-field communications.” 87
IV.

OPENNESS OF THE MARKETPLACE

The relationship of patents to the openness of the smartphone market for
small participants is, like that of large participants, difficult to isolate. The
trends in three areas provide insight for the assessment of openness of the
smartphone market to small participants: A) market access; B) market exit; and
C) litigation.
A. Access to the Market
The findings show that patents in the smartphone field help provide access
to the market for small players. Whether the ease of access is equivalent for
small market participants that do not hold any patents, the data here
demonstrates that a portfolio of smartphone patents increases the likelihood of
survival, and of being funded, acquired, or going public. The sample of patent
holding companies with a small presence in the smartphone market showed a
very high rate of survival or successful exit, well above the average for small
tech companies in general. Though not an absolute requirement to do business,
obtaining a patent covering smartphone innovations does seem to help
considerably in gaining access to funding.
The research affirms that patents provide credibility to small participants
with respect to investors. One reason may be that patents are expensive to
prosecute and the existence of a patent demonstrates access to capital and a
willingness to invest in the company’s future (on average the companies had
filed 4.45 patents before their first funding event 88). This credibility may
explain why a small entity in the smartphone field with patents has a
disproportionately high probability of receiving funding and surviving.
The research shows that a very large portfolio of patents is not necessarily
better than a small one. A company with just a few patents greatly increases its
AOL Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88463 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2012); Varia Holdings LLC v.
Samsung Electronics Co, Ltd., No. 1:12-CV-01899; Veveo, Inc. v. Comcast Corp. et al., No.
1:13-CV-11885; Nonend Inventions NV v. Spotify USA Inc. et al., No. 1:13-CV-00389;
Starhome GmbH v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 743 F.3d 849 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
87. Maija Palmer, CSR seeks out acquisitions, Financial Times, Oct. 27, 2009.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/b23392ea-c321-11de-8eca-00144feab49a.html
88. See supra section IV.C.1.
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access to the market through funding and a company with ten or more patents
substantially increases its likelihood of survival. 89 Beyond ten patents,
however, no significant increase was observed in the ability to survive and
there is no meaningful correlation between the number of patents and the
amount of funding received. 90 This is important with respect to entry costs. The
cost of obtaining a professionally drafted and prosecuted U.S. patent is
somewhere between $5,000 and $20,000. 91 Therefore, the cost of obtaining
several patents is not prohibitively high for a small commercial enterprise. If a
very large portfolio of patents were required for survival and funding, the legal
and filing fees could be considered a substantial barrier to entry. For example,
if small companies needed a defensive portfolio to respond to large
participants’ infringement assertions that were designed to quash competition,
the cost of entry might be prohibitive. This study did not observe such a barrier.
Small participants, though, focused on the communications segment of the
market. The findings show that the vast majority (80%) of smartphone patents
produced by the small players are communications patents. 92 Software is the
second in line with 12%, design is a low 6%, and hardware represents only 2%
of patents in our data set. 93 The low rate of hardware and design patents might
be explained by the costs of reducing an invention to practice. For hardware,
expensive machinery may be needed to build prototypes of hardware. This may
change in the near future with the proliferation of 3D printing. Design patents
are usually for consumer products and our small players rarely have a
consumer-facing product. Instead, they sell their products to other businesses
that then include them in a consumer product.
The low number of software patents as compared to communications
patents is more difficult to explain because the process of creating software and
new communications methods is closely related. This might be explained by
the confusing jurisprudence surrounding the enforceability of patents on
software. The Supreme Court has in essence stated that software patent claims
need to be limited to a commercial embodiment. 94 Another possible
explanation is that prosecuting and enforcing communications patents may be
perceived as easier.

89. See supra Table 17.
90. See supra sections IV.B.1 (Table 17) and IV.C.1.
91. Paul Chang, The Costs of Obtaining Patent Protection, WOLVERINE STARTUP LAW

(Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.wolverine-startuplaw.com/2014/04/15/the-costs-of-obtainingpatent-protection/.
92. See supra Table 13.
93. Id.
94. See e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 593 (2010); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2347(2014).
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B. Exit
A successful “exit” is the hallmark of the venture capital world 95 and
represents an open market if both access and exit options exist for small
participants. For an investor, the “exit” goal is to make a profit on the invested
capital. Exit may occur by an internal buy-out of early investors, by another
company’s acquisition of the organization, or by the company offering shares
to the public on a stock market.
The small participants with smartphone patents fare very well in terms of
their potential for an exit. Of the forty companies represented among the fortysix small participants sample, fifteen (37.5%) exited through a successful
acquisition event. Another four (10%) offered shares publicly on a stock
exchange. 96 This is a very high percentage showing that there are readily
available exit options along with investor confidence in those businesses
holding patents with a small presence in the smartphone market. The patents,
thus, appear to serve as a valuable asset for small participants.
But as with funding in general, there is no meaningful correlation in the
research results between the amount of money generated by an exit event (an
acquisition or an IPO in this study) and the number of patents. Thus, while a
smartphone patent portfolio may be helpful to secure a successful exit, there is
no indication that a large portfolio with many patents is necessary for a small
market participant to exit successfully.
C. Litigation
Few patent holders seem interested in suing the small players in the
smartphone field for patent infringement. With two exceptions, the small
participants were not the targets of any oppressive costly litigation brought by
competitors. 97 To the contrary, small participants sued large industry players
for patent infringement more often than the other way around. And the few
study participants that were the subject of patent litigation campaigns had
already grown large enough to absorb those costs on their balance sheets by the
time of that litigation, as demonstrated by the research results relating to market
longevity. 98 In addition, NPEs do not appear to target small participants. This
95. See
e.g.
Exit
Strategy,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/exitstrategy.asp (last visited Oct. 31, 2014); Nicole
Gravagna, Peter K. Adams, Venture Company Exit Options, DUMMIES,
http://www.dummies.com/how-to/content/venture-company-exit-options.html (last visited
Oct. 31, 2014).
96. Data regarding the internal buyout of investors was not publicly available.
Companies that went public are: 1) PureDepth; 2) Augme; 3) XG Technology; and 4)
Control4.
97. One company closed its doors following patent litigation, Wisair, Ltd., but the suit
did not appear as the reason Wisair ceased to exist.
98. See supra sections IV.A.1 and IV.D.1.
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study found only one example when a small market participant was sued as a
primary defendant by a NPE for infringement of a smartphone patent. 99
The relatively low instance of patent litigation may be due to cost.
According to a study performed by the American Intellectual Property Law
Association (AIPLA) in 2013, the costs of patent litigation are extremely
high. 100 Table 22 below illustrates these costs. Expenses can run as high as $2.8
million for disputes where the amount in controversy is between $1 million and
$25 million. Disputes that exceed $25 million more than double that cost with
an average of $5.9 million. And disputes of $1 million or less cost on average
almost $1 million through trial, a cost that often exceeds the amount at stake.
Table 22 – Costs of Patent Litigation Generally101
Amount in Controversy

Cost through Discovery

Cost through Trial

<$1mm
$1mm - $10mm
$1mm - $25mm
$10mm - $25mm
>$25mm

$530K
$1.2mm
$1.7mm
$2.2mm
$3.6mm

$970K
$2.1mm
$2.8mm
$3.6mm
$5.9mm

When an NPE sues a company for patent infringement, the cost of
litigation is slightly lower. 102
While the threat of costly patent infringement litigation might be used to
create a significant barrier to entry, the cost-benefit analysis makes it unlikely
that a small participant will actually be sued. The benefits for plaintiffs may be
limited. According to Price Waterhouse Cooper’s annual litigation trends
report, the most prevalent measure of damages for patent infringement is a
reasonable royalty. 103 Reasonable royalties are typically calculated as a
percentage of revenue made on a product that embodies an infringed patent and
that would have resulted from a hypothetical licensing negotiation. 104 This
means that even with a hypothetical royalty as high as 10%, a small target
company would need $10 million in revenue just from infringing products for a
plaintiff to recover the costs of bringing the lawsuit. 105 While the Price

99. Sipco, LLC v. Control4 Corp (1:11-CV-00612); Olivistar, LLC v. Control4
Corporation (2:14-CV-00393); See also supra IV.D.1.
100. 2013
Report
of
the
Economic
Survey,
AIPLA,
http://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/library/books/econsurvey/2013EconomicSurvey/Pages/d
efault.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2014).
101. Id.
102. Id. This slight reduction in cost is likely due to the fact that NPEs, by their nature,
have no competing business to permit a countersuit and counter-discovery.
103. 2014 PWC Study, supra note 2 at 13.
104. See TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 898-99 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
105. Moreover, jury trials yield much higher damages than bench trials and are used
much more often in patent trials, especially in the telecommunications industry. 2014 PWC
study, supra note 80, at 15. But small companies are known to play the bully card if a larger
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Waterhouse Coopers’ study further indicates that median damages are the
largest in the telecommunications field compared to the nine other fields
examined, 106 this does not seem to be enough to justify the high cost of
litigation or the long time to trial (median time to trial for an NPE is 2.5 years
with a 25% success rate and the median time for a practicing entity is 2.28
years with a 35% success rate). Even if a plaintiff is able to secure a sufficiently
high judgment, there is no guarantee that the small market participant will be
able to pay. The high cost of patent litigation, the inability to shift costs to the
loser, and the low potential for high damages may actually be keeping
offensive litigants from stifling small players.
For some of the large market participants, restraint in litigation against
small participants may be a strategic choice for good will. If a large player
begins suing all its potential competitors to eliminate them from the industry,
they may receive backlash from their own customers or a government agency,
or they may inadvertently bring publicity to competitors from media coverage.
One survey participant explained that the first mover advantage—being the first
with a new product on the market—as opposed to patent assertions is the best
way to protect a company’s place in the market. It is also a difficult task to
convince a jury and the public that a large corporation suing a small entity is
not a bully.
Lastly, cease and desist letters might pose threats to small participants.
These letters inform an adverse party of the existence of one or more patents
and of the patent owner’s intent to assert their rights. This in turn triggers
several legal doctrines. It helps ensure that the patent owner does not lose the
right to enforce the patent in the future. 107 A letter that specifies a patent also
provides notice to the target company—a requirement for a claim of willful
infringement, which can significantly increase damages. A widespread letter
campaign could extract costly licensing fees from some of the targets that fear
litigation and its high costs. But a cease and desist letter campaign may have a
weak effect if litigation is not seen as a real possibility. The high cost of
litigation, the low likelihood of recouping those costs from a small company,
and the low instance of observed litigation against small companies may
undercut the threat to small market participants of cease and desist letters.
However, we have no way of measuring the actual effect of cease and desist

company or a non-practicing entity brings a patent infringement suit. These facts combined
with the high costs likely discourage patent litigation against small players in the smartphone
field (and likely in other fields as well). This may explain why large market participants in
the smartphone space and non-practicing entities choose not to assert patents against small
players in court.
106. 2014 PWC Study, supra note 2, at 13.
107. For instance, the doctrines of collateral estoppel or laches prevent a patent holder
from laying in wait while a company builds an entire business around a patented invention
and then pouncing on them to demand their revenue years later. See e.g. Ashe v. Swenson,
397 U.S. 436, 436 (1970).
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letters such as licensing fees paid to avoid litigation. 108
The data shows that patent litigation does not seem to be a barrier to entry
in the smartphone field. The common perception that small companies are
being stifled by unscrupulous, unfair, and overburdening litigation is not
supported by our data for the smartphone market. 109
CONCLUSION
Patents are an important tool for small players entering the smartphone
market. With a few patents, small participants gain access to the market
through financing that results from their increased attractiveness to investors as
compared to the startup industry in general. The ability to obtain a number of
patents also enhances small participants’ ability to survive and to effect a
successful market exit. This means that entry and exit are enhanced by small
participants’ patent holdings. Patent litigation, whether from operating
companies or NPEs, does not appear to be a significant concern for small
players and does not appear to pose barriers to entry. These are all positive
indicators that patent rights are providing incentives for innovation among
entry participants and small industry players.

108. Our review of press releases from the companies did not provide any information
about cease and desist letter campaigns and we had insufficient survey responses to draw
information.
109. Loek Essers, ‘Patent Trolls’ Cost Tech Companies $29 Billion Last Year, Study
Says,
PC
WORLD
(June
27,
2012),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/258395/patent_trolls_cost_tech_companies_29_billion_last
_year_study_says.html.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A – LIST OF SELECTED SMALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE SMARTPHONE
MARKET

Airwalk Communications, Inc.
Altair Semiconductor, Ltd.
Augme Technologies, Inc.
Beyer Jr, Malcolm K (Individual Inventor)
Bitstream, Inc.
Carrier IQ, Inc.
Cellemetry, LLC
Cequint, Inc.
Control4, Corp.
Core Mobility, Inc.
Cortina Systems, Inc.
Daylife, Inc.
Exphand, Inc.
IncNetworks, Corp.
Intertel, Inc.
Interstate Electronics, Corp.
ISP Operator Corp.
iTechTool, Inc.
Kauffman, George M (Individual Inventor)
KD Secure, LLC
Knapp, Ronald P (Individual Inventor)
Legend Silicon Corp.
LiveWire Mobile, Inc.
Nethra Imaging, Inc.
Newport Media, Inc.
NexStep, Inc.
Nonend Inventions, N.V.
Octasic, Inc.
ORO Grande Technology, LLC
PureDepth, Inc.
Salmon Technologies, LLC
Samhain Inion, LLC
SiRF Technology, Inc.
StarHome, GmbH.
Strix Systems, Inc.
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Sudharshan, Srinivasan (Individual Inventor)
Tensorcomm ,Inc.
Townsend, Michael L (Individual Inventor)
Ubinetics, Ltd.
Varia Mobil, LLC
Veveo, Inc.
Viktor, Kaptelinin (Individual Inventor)
Wisair, Ltd.
Wmode, Inc.
Xcerion, Ab.
XG Technology, Inc.
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